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Who could have foreseen that at the dawn of the twenty-
first century, paid domestic work would be a growth
occupation? – Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo
 
1. Introduction
1 In the past five years, immigration policies of major European Union governments have
come under fire from within. Heads of State in France, Germany and the UK have all
taken an increasingly tough tone in their public pronouncements, using “immigration
reform” – meaning, anti-immigrant policies and border-closing strategies – as a key part
of  election  campaigns.  Their  harsh  rhetoric  has  apparently  found an  echo in  public
opinion in each country: in a Financial Times/Harris Poll from February 2007, a majority
of those surveyed in Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Germany said that their countries
contained “too many people from foreign countries”1 (Harris, 2007). In that same poll, a
majority  in  each  European  country  surveyed  agreed  with  the  statement  that  their
government  should  “tighten  up  its  border  controls  to  stem  the  flow  of  workers
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immigrating  from Central  and  Eastern  Europe.”  The  poll  asked  broad,  philosophical
questions about the acceptability and propriety of current immigration trends, but shied
away from asking questions that were specific to the lives, and quality of life, of middle-
class  Europeans.  For  example,  respondents  were  not  asked,  “Do  you  approve  when
someone hires an au pair from Poland?” Nor did they expect respondents to answer the
question, “Would you hire a house cleaner from Morocco?” The survey highlights the
xenophobia  immigrants  often  face,  but  also  points  out  the  disconnect  between
government policy and economic and social reality. Are people prepared to clean their
own houses,  care for their own children and elderly parents,  shoulder the burden of
reproductive labor on a household-by-household and day-to-day basis? And what would
happen to productivity and labor-force participation if they did?
2 Calls for tighter borders make little sense, and will have little effect, when restrictive laws
are not enforced and administrative policies are not adjusted to reflect the new realities
of employers’ demand for labor. This tacit acceptance of the inflow of undocumented
workers perpetuates the invisibility of immigrants with regard to labor policy; it denies
immigrants important safety and security protections granted other workers.2 But it also
perpetuates (and is perpetuated by) the invisibility of women in the receiving countries
as professionals and full participants in the labor force, and sustains (and is sustained by)
the social silence about what Arlie Hochschild has called “the stalled revolution in the
family” (Hochschild, 1990).
3 Our paper examines the current immigration “policy gap”: the combination of restrictive
policies with the fact that those policies do not work, because they are unenforced and
perhaps unenforceable. Our first level of finding (which is hardly new) is that restrictive
policies are at best irrelevant to the flow of workers across borders to take low-paying
domestic jobs, often as part of a “shadow economy.”3 We suggest further that restrictive
policies may have the opposite effect from the official intentions of receiving
governments. What the policy gap does is to keep wages low and workers vulnerable, thus
ensuring that they will be attractive to employers. Given the persistence in global income
inequality, women in developing countries will still migrate to do domestic work. The
policy gap is thus self-perpetuating.
4 Feminist  analysis  is  crucial  because  it  can  help  scholars  and  policy-makers  better
understand the demand or “pull factors” within the receiving countries. Domestic work is
different from other sorts of labor because it occurs within the so-called “private sphere”
of  the  family,  which is  both  an  economic  and an  ideological  formation;  and thus  it
participates  in  the complexities,  contradictions,  and mystifications  about  gender  and
power which feminist theory has long identified there. But feminist methodology will be
incomplete  and  flawed  unless  it  takes  the  sort  of  “intersectionalities”  approach
recommended by (among others)  Chandra Mohanty and Kimberley Crenshawe, which
would see gender relations as crucially structured by differentials of race, nation, and
ethnicity.  Domestic  work (whether paid or unpaid)  has long been socially defined as
“women’s work”; that paid domestic work is increasingly also defined by national and
racial distance and difference between employer and employee is no accident. In other
words,  the demand which drives  (and is  driven by)  the policy gap is  not  simply for
workers who are willing to accept low wages and poor conditions, who just happen to be
immigrants because of economic differences between receiving and sending countries
(though that does help explain why such workers are available and willing to move.)
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Rather, the demand is specifically, and crucially, for foreign women to do these sorts of
work, and it arises within a web of economic and ideological factors.4
5 Domestic work is in-demand everywhere. So domestic workers ought to be very mobile,
like  nurses  or  computer  programmers.  And they are  indeed very mobile.  But  unlike
nurses or computer programmers, they are not in a good position to negotiate high wages
and good working conditions. Why? Xenophobia, racism, the perception of immigrants as
extracommunitarian  “Others”  certainly  play  a  part,  but  they  are  not  the  whole
explanation: there is something peculiar about domestic work that requires a gender
analysis.5 At the same time, it is clearer than ever that appealing to some vague notion of
women as held responsible for “reproductive labor” and as therefore having some form of
oppression in common really does not correspond to demographics or lived reality. An
intersectionalities perspective is thus crucial. The gender analysis doesn’t “work” without
the race-and-nation based analysis, or vice versa, because the two forms of disadvantage
are not additive, they are inextricable: they “mean” together, so they must be “read”
simultaneously.6
 
2. The Policy Gap and the Gender Gap
6 Scholars  studying immigration policy  have often noted the  discrepancy between the
apparent intent of official state policies and the outcomes of these laws and regulation
regarding the volume and type of immigration.7 This disparity between aims and effects
of  immigration  policy  has  been  variously  attributed  to  poor  planning  and  complex
circumstances  that  produced  unintended  results  (Martin,  2004;  Hollifield,  2004),
intermixed with “spotty enforcement” (Calavita, 2004:376). But the underlying reasons
for this combination of unattainable policy goals and slack enforcement in a wide range
7 of countries lie in the contradictions arising out of interest group politics, domestic and
international institutional structures, and the underlying social and economic forces that
generate  migration  pressures.8 Amid  the  complexity  and  lack  of  policymaking
transparency, immigration policy toward domestic workers, typically women working in
other people’s homes, can perhaps be viewed as having the biggest policy gap: because
the work is “hidden” in the informal sector and in the private sphere, it has never been
properly  addressed  by  policymakers.  Until  recently,  European  governments  hadn’t
addressed migrant domestic labor at all  as part of  an overall  migration management
scheme.9
8 Female migrants have little access to formal sector jobs, and therefore take on informal
sector jobs – what Anderson calls “the three C’s”: cooking, cleaning and caring – typically
those derived from traditionally delineated gender roles (Anderson, 2000; Ehrenreich and
Hochschild, 2002). Migrants will be more able and willing to “live-in” since they have
fewer in-country private relationships or personal connections outside the home (Akalin,
2007). Iffy immigration status makes migrants even more vulnerable and dependent on
their employers (Anderson, 2007). Moreover, “foreignness” or being ethnically “other”
gives employers reasons for hiring migrants over existing local workers: employers may
feel morally superior for helping out someone from a poor country or may feel more
comfortable having someone not of their own race in a market transaction carried out in
their own home (Anderson, 2007). Ideas that in-migrant groups, or different races, have
an incompatible gender structure, ideology, or a “different” family, may also serve as an
excuse for unconcern about who is looking after the childminder’s children or cleaning
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the  housekeeper’s  house.10 In  particular,  this  may address,  or  at  least  mask,  socially
induced  anxieties  among  professional  women about  whether  they  are  also  adequate
mothers (and thus adequate women): if the tasks of caring can be done just as well by
someone else, what remains of the maternal role and identity? But a paid caregiver whose
difference from the child is ethnically marked is less likely to be mistaken for the child’s
“real” mother by outsiders (or indeed by the child). The worker needs to be somehow
marked as “Other” so that “women’s work” can be distinguished from “woman’s role,”
and so that educated women may free themselves from the burden of the former without
paying the social costs of being seen to abandon the latter.
9 Migratory domestic labor has been of particular interest to feminists for a variety of
reasons. First because (like sex trafficking) it puts certain women as women in positions of
social disadvantage and serious risk; but second because, given that domestic labor as
such remains ineluctably gendered, it appears to put different groups of women at odds
with each other, with the upward migration (so to speak) of women in host countries
dependent on the geographical migration of women incomers.11 A rise in income levels,
and public status, for some women appears to depend on keeping other women poorly
paid  and  invisible.  On  this  account,  professional  women  need  caretakers  for  their
children (and sometimes their parents), along with housecleaners to carry out domestic
chores in order to compete with men in the workplace12; hiring unauthorized migrant
workers as domestics is cheap, with penalties for doing so rarely imposed on employers;
in addition, an aging population increases the demand for home health care workers (and
the erosion of the welfare state and social responsibility for care makes this situation
worse). For a wide range of countries, this problem continues to be seen as a “women’s
issue,” because domestic work is “women’s work”; thus the situation is seen as women’s
fault (and as women’s responsibility to solve within the so-called private sphere).
10 Ideological mystifications of economic factors play multiple roles here. One problem is
the lack of awareness of middle-class citizens in receiving countries about how their own
economic behavior as employers is in fact driving the migratory trends that now make
them nervous. This happens in part because the employers of domestic laborers often do
not see themselves as employers. Women, as Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994) shows,
see  themselves  as  consumers of  immigrant  labor  (as  buying  services)  rather  than  as
employers of immigrant persons; and many if not most men still do not see themselves as
involved in the labor circuit of the private sphere at all. It is not unusual, and in fact it is
economically rational, for household budgeting to balance the income of the wife against
the cost of domestic work (seen as a “replacement” for the wife’s domestic labor). Given
that women in the formal economy are still paid less than men, a decision for the middle-
class wife to suppress her own educational capital and stay home might seem like (and
indeed might be) a purely rational, and purely individual, economic choice, not informed
by sexism or indeed by ideology at all. The aggregate effect of these individual choices is
however self-perpetuating, as the lower labor force participation of educated women and
their segregation within certain occupations keeps the wages of all women low.
 
3. Restrictions or Regularization? European
Destinations for Women Migrants
11 As  Hondagneu-Sotelo  has  observed,  the  “New  World  Domestic  Order”  entails  paid
domestic work becoming, surprisingly,  a “growth industry,” with migration fueled by
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economic inequality both within the U.S. and European countries and between different
countries, leading in turn to what Hochschild has called “global care chains.”13
12 Women entering the professional ranks in industrialized countries have fueled demand
for domestic workers, thereby pulling in women from around the world to clean, care and
cook. Table 1 below shows the growing proportion of women in the labor force in various
European countries that coincides with women being more likely to work and earning
more per hour on average. Education levels were rising as well during this time, with over
half of women in the 25-34 age group having tertiary/university education by the year
2000.14 In  the  highest  education  category,  European  women  tend  to  have  very  high
employment  rates,  ranging  from 74% in  Spain  to  93% in  Portugal  (Pissarides  et  al.,
2004:73). Many of these women were likely in high income, dual-earner households, the
type that would be most likely to hire domestic workers and/or nannies. Not only do
these trends explain the persistence of income inequality between European households,
but  they also  point  toward the reasons  that  paid domestic  work has  been a  growth
industry: the combination of increased education and higher employment rates as women
become a larger percentage of  the overall  labor force indicates  the source of  strong
demand for domestic service workers’ labor.
 
Table 1: Women as a percentage of the labor force, 1980-2004 (in %)
Country/Year 1980 1990 2000 2004
Ireland 28 34 41 42
Spain 28 34 39 41
Italy 33 37 38 40
Portugal 39 43 45 46
Germany 39 40 44 45
France 40 43 45 46
UK 41 44 46 46
Source: World Bank data, 2006.
13 From the “supply” side of the equation, we know that there are various family pressures
and social forces that may encourage women to migrate: a lack of good job opportunities
at home is only part of the issue.15 In recent academic literature, much has been made of
migrants’ use of social capital to help them make migration decisions (Massey and Aysa,
2005). Leblang, et al. (2007) find that social networks lessen the risks of migration, with
large loose networks helping to provide migrants with useful information and smaller,
tighter  networks  providing  better  support.  Ethnic  social  networks  can  also  assist
immigrants  in  integrating  into  the  host  culture  or  generate  ethnic enclaves,  where
integration into the larger society is not necessary in order to function as a domestic
worker. While these networks may be more or less active in various places, it is clear that
these networks commonly enable domestic workers to migrate. As such, the operation of
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these networks affects how and whether government policy has the intended effect. For
example, if the government decides to restrict the number of asylum seekers and limits
their ability to work, migrants are more likely to choose to enter illegally with the help of
an ethnic network and work in someone’s home, rather than get government assistance
as a refugee.  The shadow economy serves as an escape valve when other avenues of
migration are cut off, and the policy gap widens as a result of the restrictive policy.
14 Given the private nature of the work, hard data (even reasonably good estimates) on the
total number of domestic workers are difficult to come by, but it is safe to say that at least
several million migrant women are working in domestic service around the world.16 As a
country with one of the largest emigration flows of women, Parreñas (2001:1) argues that
from the Philippines alone there may be more than two million female migrant domestic
workers  spread  around  the  globe.  Overall  worldwide  flows  are  large,  but  what  is
necessary  here  is  to  show  what  is  happening  in  Europe  – that  this  phenomenon  is
important in a range of European countries that have differing immigration policy. The
use of the data here has to be more subtle because of the lack of availability of definitive
migration data disaggregated by gender, as noted by Morrison, et al. (2008:2). But this
notion that domestic work as a growth industry can be seen in the evidence showing that
a larger share of the world’s migrants are going to developed countries, including those
in the European Union, and that an increasing proportion of them are women. Since a
greater proportion of female migrants are going to Europe, it is likely the case that a
greater proportion – both increasing over time and a greater share than to the rest of the
world – of domestic workers are going there as well.
15 Worldwide as of 2005, 3% of the total population is estimated to be migrants, and women
are now nearly half of the world’s migrants: 49.6%. But where Europe is concerned, the
proportion of women migrants is more than half (See Table 2.) Data for the World and
Europe as a whole are included for comparison purposes.)
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Table 2: Female Migrants to Select European Countries, 2005 (in % of Total Migrants)
Country/Year 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Germany … … 44.5 44.8 46.7 48.3
UK 50.3 51.1 51.9 52.7 53.5 54.3
France 47.3 48.3 49.1 49.9 50.7 51.6
Ireland 50.6 50.4 50.3 50.2 50.1 50.0
Spain 51.7 51.6 51.6 51.4 50.3 47.4
Portugal 52.5 52.2 52.2 52.1 52.1 52.0
Italy 56.8 56.6 56.4 56.2 56 55.8
Europe 48.1 48.9 52.8 52.7 53.4 53.4
World 47.2 47.2 49 49.3 49.7 49.6
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations
Secretariat, Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision.
16 Combining the impact of forces of “demand” and “supply” for migrant domestic workers,
it is easy to see that restrictive policy may not have the intended effect. Strong “pull”
factors  along  with  more  restrictive  policies  (e.g.,  fewer  work  permits  available)  will
simply encourage people to “go underground.” But as undocumented migrants,  these
women will receive lower pay. From an economic theory point of view, it is clear that
having  migrants  having  legal  work  permits  will  receive  a  higher  wage  than
undocumented migrants – employers include the probabilistic cost of being caught hiring
illegally as a penalty for undocumented workers that would otherwise receive the same
wage as documented migrants doing the same job. For the US, Borjas and Tiendas (1993)
estimated this differential at 30% (i.e., undocumented migrants receive wages 30% lower
than documented migrants from the same sending countries.) A more recent study of
migrant  workers  by  Mehta,  et  al. (2002)  in  Chicago  reached  a  similar  conclusion:
undocumented Latin American men received a 22% wage penalty, while undocumented
Latin American women received wages 36% lower than the typical documented migrant
worker. A greater probability of employers being caught hiring undocumented workers
would increase the wage penalty for those workers, but would not do much to reduce the
overall supply of migrant workers. Women migrants doing domestic work in people’s
homes tend to be “protected” from the possibility of being caught in a government raid
designed to find undocumented workers at work – immigration officials typically do not
take  domestic  workers  from the  homes  of  citizens,  preferring  to  focus  enforcement
efforts on large-scale operations, raiding factories or worksites where they know they
will find a high concentration of undocumented workers. Despite the protective effect of
working in a private home, tighter government enforcement efforts can still lead to lower
wages along with greater vulnerability of migrant women in domestic work because the
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employer has enhanced power over the employee when the risks of being caught in more
public types of work are higher.
17 Based on various estimates of irregular migration and on the experience of countries that
have carried out periodic “regularizations,” we know that the numbers of undocumented
workers in European countries are high, with Germany and the UK each having more
than 1 million irregular migrants. (See Table 3 below.) It should be noted that these are
based on very rough estimates for irregular migrants, and are conservative relative to
Papademetriou’s (2005) “guesstimate” of 7-8 million noted earlier. In fact, in a recent
interview with Eurasylum, Hervé Carré, Director-General of Eurostat, the statistical arm
of the European Commission,  stated that  the European Union would not even try to
estimate the number of irregular migrants in European countries.17 The main goal of the
European Union with regard to migration appears to be gathering data and harmonizing
statistical procedures, indicating just how distant a “unified” immigration policy may be.
18
 
Table 3: Estimated proportions of irregular migrants in select European countries, 2003
Country Irregular Migrants as % of Country’s
Total Migrants
Irregular  Migrants  as  %  of  Country’s
Total Population
Portugal 42.96 0.96
Italy 30.59 0.87
UK 24.82 1.68
Spain 22.24 0.67
Germany 13.61 1.21
France 6.37 0.67
Ireland 3.23 0.25
Source: Mansoor, Ali M. and Bryce Quillin. Migration and Remittances: Eastern Europe and the Former
Soviet Union, p. 45.
18 Despite the lack of harmonization of immigration policies among EU countries, we find
similarly large policy gaps in many countries across Europe with regard to unauthorized
immigrants based on the fact that the proportions of irregular to regular migrants is
fairly high. In addition, countries that have stricter immigration policies (Germany and
the UK), do not have significantly lower levels of irregular immigration, nor do they have
lower overall immigration as a proportion of the total population than those who have
done periodic regularizations (Italy,  Spain).  (See Table 4 below.)  Tighter immigration
policy does not appear to mean greater conformity to stated government goals.
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Table 4: Stock of Migrants as % of Total Population (select European countries), 2005 
Country Stock of Migrants (in
millions)
2005 Population (millions,
mid-year)
Migrants as % of Total
Population
Germany 10.1 82.4 12.26
UK 5.4 60.4 8.94
France 6.5 62.9 10.33
Spain 4.8 40.3 11.91
Italy 2.5 58.1 4.30
Source: UN, Trends in Total Migrant Stock, 2005 Revision; US Census Bureau
19 Looking at the history of large-scale “regularizations” carried out by the major European
migrant destinations reveals a pattern of relative leniency in some countries, and greater
restrictiveness in others. Since 1980, Italy has regularized roughly 1.5 million workers in
five  waves  of  programs,  including  one  in  2002  designed  to  target  caretakers  and
dependent workers.19 Over the same time period, Spain has regularized over ½ million
workers,  while  the  UK  regularized  fewer  than  1000  domestic  workers.20 Germany
regularized about 30,000 workers during the 1990s21.  More restrictive policy does not
appear to coincide with reduced flows of migrants, or of the estimates of migrants with
irregular status.
20 Based on the evidence above, it  appears that there are no striking differences in the
immigration policy gaps or outcomes based on different government actions or socio-
economic  contexts.  Different  immigration  policy  strategies  among  large  European
countries over the past two decades led to similar results: a policy gap that does not
depend much on the various contexts or particularities of the economies involved. This
finding leads us to agree with Parreñas in her study of Filipina domestic workers in Los
Angeles and Rome (Parrenas et al.,  2007). She expected to find striking differences in
these women’s experiences based on “contexts of reception.” Instead, she argues that the
reason for their striking similarities “rests largely on their positioning in globalization as
part of the secondary tier labor force of the economic bloc of postindustrial nations.”22
 
4. Defining the Problem
21 But what is  wrong with migratory domestic  labor? In fact,  this  does not  go without
saying. If migratory domestic labor is damaging, we need to lay out clearly how, and why,
and for whom, before we can ask at what level solutions need to be proposed. When we
refer to a “policy gap,” for instance, our concern is not to help governments design more
successful restrictive policies in the interests of racial and national “purity.” On the face
of it, connecting workers who need more money than they can make without leaving
home with work that needs to be done sounds like a good idea. Moreover, the long-range
view taken by historians and anthropologists reminds us that migration is normal, has
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always  been  part  of  the  cycles  of  human  life.23 Should  we  really  regard  economic
migration as a sign of crisis (in either sending or receiving countries), or can we see it as
part  of  stable  systems of  exchange,  as  fulfilling a function for  both parties  (because
otherwise  it  would  not  be  occurring)?  It  is  possible  that  those  countries  that  are
attempting to restrict immigration are acting from simple racism or even simple fear of
change,  and they should be told to “get over it.” Especially since in the case we are
discussing, the exchange of women across borders actually facilitates, and stays within
the model of, capitalism, merely seeking to (partially) extend its benefits to a slightly
wider group. If we are inclined to see the movement of host-country women into the
labor force, and their upward mobility within that labor force, as a good thing (either
from the perspective of greater productivity or from a liberal feminist perspective), we
could applaud the flexibility of transnational capitalism in easing the social costs of that
transition.
22 But like many social issues, the issue of immigrant women “doing the dirty work” of
cleaning, cooking and caring presents problems on various levels and for all governments
and social groups involved. The feedback effects are key here. First, it maintains deep-
seated social (and thus economic) inequities, because it relieves pressure on men – they
don’t have to do housework because low-paid migrant women do their share and more.
This  reinforces  the  idea  that  is  still  pervasive  in  the  US  and  much  of  Europe  that
housework is women’s work. Hiring immigrant women to do a family’s domestic work
may  ease  marital  relations,  but  at  the  expense  of  continuing  stereotypes  that  poor
migrant women can only do jobs based on “innate” feminine skills.24 Second, although the
remittances paid back to the sending countries may help those countries, they do so at
the expense of the care deficit Parreñas talks about with respect to the Philippines. Third,
while we want to emphasize that it is restrictive policy, rather than lack of enforcement
that is the problem, the current situation of migrant domestic labor does presenta policy
problem  for  receiving  governments,  in  that  it  undermines  democratic  values  by
permanently/essentially  disadvantaging  certain  groups,  and  encouraging  specifically
gender-inflected forms of  racism.25 The concern here is  not  so much that  inflows of
workers don’t match the levels officially desired by the receiving country, but rather that
this  institutionalized  policy  gap  prevents  acknowledging  immigrants,  and  especially
women  who  migrate  to  do  domestic  work,  as  “real  workers”  making  an  essential
contribution to  the  economic  health  of  the  receiving  countries.  Such misrecognition
contributes to the cycle of xenophobia and backlash in periods of perceived economic
threat and does nothing to address underlying and persistent issues of gender inequity.
23 There is something ethically and politically troubling about the exploitation of women to
serve the reproductive needs of capitalism, even if that exploitation can be “outsourced.”
It seems that keeping borders formally “closed” when they are to all practical purposes
actually rather porous is a quasi-deliberate strategy to maintain this low-cost service to
capitalism. What underlies this is a pervasive functionalist approach to women’s position
within society, which (as Susan Moller Okin [1989] has explained) asks what women are
for, rather than seeing them as full social and ethical agents in their own right. The fact
that some women escape this, on the backs of others, and that some (from both groups)
may even benefit from it, does not remove this problem.26
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5. Some Flawed Solutions
24 From  the  supply  side,  it  does  not  seem  either  practical,  or  ethically  acceptable  to
discourage women from migrating to do this work. Plus, as Keely (2000: 58) has argued,
the assumption that economic migration is voluntary needs to be problematized27.
25 And yet from the demand side, it hardly seems acceptable to simply encourage middle-
class women to return to the private sphere, stay home and clean their own houses while
men advance in high-earning occupations and dominate the public world. In fact, “guilt-
tripping” and a speed-up in what constitutes acceptable middle-class mothering is part of
what perpetuates the wage gap between men and women of  comparable educational
attainment. As Hondagneu-Sotelo (2001) observes,
an abolitionist  program smacks of  the utopian,  not  the feasible.  Domestic  work
should not fall disproportionately on the shoulders of any one group...but putting
an end to domestic employment is not the answer. Upgrading the occupation, a
change ushered in  by systematic  regulation and by public  recognition that  this
seemingly private activity is a job – one that creates particular obligations on both
employees and employers – is our best chance. (xiv)
26 It  is  especially  clear  that  the  problem cannot  be  solved through calls  for  individual
voluntarism,  for  instance  by  feminist  appeals  to  middle-class  women  to  treat  their
domestic workers “better.”28 Except in the case of the worst abuses, it is not even clear
what this would mean: some of the ethnographically-based work, which has the great
merit  of  giving  voice  to  the  women  workers  themselves,  calls  for  increased
professionalization of domestic labor, with attention (and compensation) based on tasks
and schedules. But other ethnographies point to the dangers, and the abusive nature, of
viewing care-giving as simply another sector of productive labor; some domestic workers
complain of  being treated like machines,  or laboring animals.  A complex ethical  and
social problem arises when a woman who has had primary responsibility for raising (and
loving) a small child is fired and told she may never see that child again.29
27 Ethnographies and narratives of all sorts emphasize the hollowness of assertions that the
domestic worker is being treated “like one of the family.”30 At the first level of analysis,
the problem is that this is a lie, but at a deeper level, the problem is the family, and the
unique  kinds  of  power  differences,  manipulations,  pressures,  and  so  forth,  that  are
naturalized there and made acceptable by the continuing fiction of a separate or different
“private sphere.”So insofar as the worker is seen as, or sees herself as, a family member
embedded in a network of affective relationships rather than a working person with a set
of contractual and/or inherent rights, her situation is both problematically different from
and problematically similar to the women who are “real” family members.
28 It seems important to recognize the “emotion work” involved in caregiving, and, on some
level, perhaps even in “homemaking,” embedded as activities like cooking and cleaning
tend to be in relationships which not only mimic, but also are, familial in nature. We can
agree that domestic workers would be better off if they were paid more reasonable wages,
and we can understand that continuing stereotypes about what is, and isn’t, “real work”
– stereotypes which now have feminist versions – are part of what keeps wages low and
conditions dire. But we cannot simply think ourselves out of this, on an individual basis.
We do not disagree at all that men should share, or that the houses of the middle-class do
not need to be as large, as luxuriously maintained, or even as clean and tidy, as upgraded
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standards of consumption now apparently dictate. But by itself this will not address the
flows of global capital and labor, any more than walking to work will solve the problem of
global  warming.  Parreñas’s label  of  “the international division of reproductive labor”
strikes  us  as  a  more  satisfying  term than “global  chains  of  care,”  because  it  is  less
sentimental and more materialist.31
29 What follows from this is a recognition that private agonizing and hand-wringing by
middle-class  women  is  ethically  as  well  as  practically  pointless.  The  international
economic structures we all inhabit enable and constrain us in various ways as members of
social groups, and the question for middle-class feminists, as Kruks (2005) points out, is
less to find therapeutic means to undo our own privilege, but rather to find ways to use
the privilege we incontrovertibly possess in productive and progressive ways.
 
6. Models for Women’s Work and Women’s Agency
30 Analysis of women’s work in migration runs up against some of the same theoretical
tangles in conceptualizing women’s work that feminists have been looking at since the
1970s. Where is the boundary between paid and unpaid labor? Do women have “class” in
the same way men do, is it more malleable, is it a helpful word at all?32 Are there some
forms of purposeful activity that are not work; if so, how should they be compensated,
and what should they be called? Does it even make sense to speak of domestic labor as a
category? A job description that includes both skilled care of the elderly and washing the
paws of the household dog twice a day is unlikely to be a useful tool of economic analysis.
What ties the category together is not the type of work involved, but the fact that women
(paid or unpaid) are the ones who do it, who are expected to do it. The regrettable fact
that information on “informal sector” and undocumented work by women is barely being
gathered may reflect a sense that this work is either “natural,” or devalued, or both; but
it is hard to see how such information could really be gathered accurately, except in
small-scale qualitative analyses. For instance, there is no way of counting the women
(migrants  or  non-migrants)  who  stay  in  bad  marriages,  or  “non-legitimized”
dysfunctional heterosexual relationships, on more or less the same terms and for more or
less the same reasons as other women migrate to do domestic labor for someone else.
31 One thing does seem clear: a “human capital” approach is particularly unsuited to this
problem. And perhaps it is unsuited to any analysis of “women’s work.”33 Because one of
the particular features of being a woman in modernity is suppressing, or at least setting
aside, the human capital that we have. Strober and Chan (1999) found this to be true for
the elite graduates of Stanford and Tokyo University; it is also true for educated women
from the Philippines, Latin America, or the former socialist republics, who find they can
make more money as domestic workers in prosperous countries than by using their skills,
and who choose to do so in large numbers, reminding us that “class” is a terribly slippery
thing  to  apply  to  women.  Once  one  accepts  a  certain  crude  gender  configuration,
“women” can always be downwardly mobile in ways “men” can’t – or perhaps won’t:
there isn’t always construction work available for law graduates, but there are always
babies who need to be diapered and toilets that need to be scrubbed; moreover,  any
woman can (at least in theory) swallow her pride (or maximize her utility) by cleaning
houses or doing sex work. The finding in Morrison, et al.  (2008: 5) that “Schooling is
positively associated with international migration of females (to non-agricultural jobs),
but not of males,” is suggestive in this regard.34
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32 When we are told that in urban India today, women with first-class degrees command
higher dowries than women without them, but not because they are expected or expect to
continue professional work outside the household,  it  becomes clear that cultural  and
educational  capital  function  differently  for  women  than  for  men,  that  it  is  not
meaningless, but works at an angle to what the theory tells us it is supposed to do. There
is much more to say about the way the idleness (for want of a better term) of women who
have been trained to work functions as an index of male economic prowess; it may be
worth looking back at a Veblen-style analysis and rethinking women’s human capital as a
function of consumption, rather than (or as well as) production.
33 As we mentioned earlier, it is problematic to try to separate “refugees” from “economic
migrants,” both because conditions of structural violence include economic factors, and
(more pragmatically) because people’s motivations may tend to be mixed (see Barile et
al.,  1994).  Mixed  motivations  also  can  characterize  some  of  the  “choices”  made  by
employers. It is problematic from the point of view of workers’ rights to see domestic
labor as a “consumer good” rather than real work done by real people; but an analysis that
sees it as also part of household consumption is not precisely wrong. What we need is a
construction of “agency” that is more flexible and multi-faceted than the rational choice
of homo economicus, who was neither a domestic woman migrant worker in the twenty-
first center, nor the mother who employs her.35
 
7. Conclusion: Toward Better Answers
34 The immigration policy gap persists in both new and old destination countries, partly due
to the private nature of the domestic work environment, but trade unions and activist
organizations  appear  to  be  making  some  headway,  indicating  that  progress  toward
protecting domestic  workers  rights  can be made through collective action.  The wide
variety of employer-employee relationships mean that a single-policy approach may not
address all the issues that activists are concerned about in this labor market. On the other
hand, increasing the complexity of the legal and regulatory environment surrounding the
immigration  of  domestic  labor  will  undoubtedly  mean greater  potential  for  an  ever
widening  policy  gap.  Furthermore,  the  cycle  of  the  unintended  consequences  of
restrictive immigration policies could continue if the trends of greater pull forces and
global income inequality persist.
35 Under  present  conditions  an  approach  based  on  collective  bargaining  by  groups  of
workers within the receiving country seems least unsatisfactory.  Some paradigms for
organizing  can  be  found  in  Anderson  (2000)  and  in  Hondagneu-Sotelo  (2001).  More
privileged progressive women would then find themselves being asked, not “be nicer to
your maid,” but “don’t cross the picket line.” We favor a strategy that prioritizes seeing
domestic work as work and domestic workers as workers first.  This,  not incidentally,
implies the need to address problems of sexism within the labor movement that has
prevented organizing workers who may be seen as casual, secondary, or “tied movers”.
But there also needs to be an ongoing analysis of the gendered nature of domestic work,
with careful attention to local variation.
36 Looser immigration policy is socially and ethically preferable, in that it underscores the
acceptance of responsibility for the international inequities that led to the immigration
flows in the first place. From an economic standpoint, it is also simply more realistic.
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37 We also call on governments to remember that immigration of men and immigration of
women are in some ways separate phenomena, in that the demand or “pull” factors are
quite different. Finally, where possible, domestic labor (like trafficking) should be seen
through the lens of a human rights, not a civil rights, approach, since (as Anderson and
others  have  pointed  out  very  persuasively)  where  the  legality  of  work  is  tied  to  a
particular employer, employee rights are fictional at best, and also since, for reasons that
remain to be fully understood, it appears to affect very different women in many places in
very similar ways.
38 It has been a curious irony, in researching this paper, that inputting “domestic labor” to
an internet search engine produces two kinds of results: domestic labor as a fancy name
for “housework,”  and domestic  labor markets  as  opposed to international  or  foreign
markets or trade. But this equivocation points to something serious: a problem about
“home” has somehow escaped and is wandering across borders; it can’t be fixed by trying
to confine it to the private sector; but it is also a home problem, and it needs to be solved
there.
39 Ethically and politically speaking, we face two intractable problems: how can we get men
to take responsibility for the domestic labor that reproduces them as workers, and as
human social beings; and how can we get receiving countries to take responsibility for
the welfare and the rights of everyone who lives and works within their borders. They are
analogous, but they are also practically related; and they will need to be solved together.
40 February 2009
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NOTES
1.  Only 43% of those surveyed in France agreed that there were “too many foreign people in
France,” while a majority (54%) of Americans surveyed answered that there were “too many
foreign people in the US.” Results for the other European countries are higher: Germany 59%;
Italy 61%; Spain 62%; Great Britain 66%. It seems important to note that not all “foreign people”
need be irregular immigrants; in fact they need not be immigrants at all, as the backlash against
US “Hispanics” suggests.
2.  Increase in undocumented work over time may also weaken the labor movement and erode
those protections for all workers, as has happened in the United States.
3.  By “shadow economy,” we mean economic activity outside the formal sector of employment,
activity  that  is  not  officially  reported  or  taxed.  See  European  Parliament  (2000)  “Report  on
Regulating Domestic Help in the Informal Sector.” Paper prepared by the Committee on Women’s
Rights  and  Equal  Opportunities,  Rapporteur  Miet  Smets,  Brussels,  17  October  2000.  See  also
Pippidi et al (2000).
4.  Bridget Anderson (2007) finds that employers of domestic workers are looking for “foreign”
women  who  are  migrants  of  particular  nationalities,  and  that  they  sometimes  prefer
undocumented status because they have more control over the migrant workers in that case.
5.  Dal Lago, 1996 argues that the influence of racism should no longer be considered “American
exceptionalism.” See also Angel-Ajani 2003 and Barile 1994.
6.  Chandra  Mohanty,  “Cartographies  of  Struggle,”  in  Feminism  Without  Borders (2003).  The
intersectionalities approach also curves back in the other direction: for instance, Mohanty also
argues  (following  R.W.  Connell)  that  “contemporary  liberal  notions  of  citizenship  are
constitutively dependent on and supported by the idea of the patriarchal household.” (65) One
example: “British nationality and immigration laws define and construct ‘legitimate’ citizenship
– an idea that is constitutionally racialized and gender-based. Beginning in the 1950s,  British
immigrant laws were written to prevent Black people (Commonwealth citizens from Africa, Asia,
the  Far  East,  Cyprus,  and  the  Caribbean)  from  entering  Britain,  thus  making  the  idea  of
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citizenship meaningless. These laws were entirely constructed around a racist, classist, ideology
of a patriarchal nuclear family, where women are never afforded subject status but are always
assumed to be legal appendages of men. For instance, the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act,
in which ancestry was decisive, permitted only Black men with work permits to enter Britain and
assumed that men who were “heads of families” could send for their “wives,” but not vice versa.”
(69)
7.  Schwenken (2005) uses gap analysis to argue that there are more opportunities for political
action since there are multiple levels of EU and national government bureaucracy.
8.  See Massey (1990) and Cornelius and Rosenblum (2005) for good overviews of the social and
economic forces behind migration.
9.  In particular, see the UN Report: “Specific Groups and Individuals: Migrant Workers.” 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/0032d58d2667f0b9c1256e700050f77f/$FILE/
G0410237.doc,  accessed  15  Oct  2007,  available.  Also  note  the  policies  dealing  with  domestic
workers, but not interrelated with migrant policy.
10.  This becomes even sharper in cases where multiple ethnicities, or perhaps it would be better
to say multiple racisms, collide, for instance when two different ethnic groups or countries of
origin are represented in a  single household,  two women working for the same professional
woman who is also a mother. Akalin (2007) cites examples in Turkey where the cleaning duties
are  carried  out  by  a  Turkish  cleaning  woman  who  lives  outside  the  household,  while  the
caretaking is  done by  a  live-in  migrant  worker  who becomes part  of  the  family.  The young
immigrant  caretaker,  likely  from  Central  Asia  or  Eastern  Europe,  is  then  trained  in  “wifely
duties”, running the household, and having her private life subsumed by the family for whom she
works.
11.  A third reason for studying domestic migrant labor is that it may illuminate long-standing,
and deep-seated, theoretical problems in conceptualizing “women’s work,” such as the difficulty
of defining “reproductive labor.”
12.  Freeman and Schettkat (2005), using standard economic reasoning, argue that workers in the
EU  should  adopt  more  “marketization  of  household  production”  in  order  to  increase  their
number of hours worked per week.
13.  Hochschild,  A.  R.  (2000)  “Care  Chains  and Emotional  Surplus  Value,”  in  Hutton,  W.  and
Giddens, A. (eds.) On The Edge: Living with Global Capitalism. London: Jonathan Cape.
14.  See Pissarides, et al.  (2004:74) This result is true for all  the European countries with the
exceptions here being the UK, with 46.8% and Germany, with 45.8% of women ages 25-34 having
higher education.
15.  For example, see Barile et al. (1994), Anderson (2000), Parreñas (2001), Akalin (2007).
16.  Papademetriou  “guesstimates”  that  there  are  perhaps  7-8  million  irregular  migrants  in
Europe.  (See  http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=336,  “The  Global
Struggle with Illegal Migration: No End in Sight.” September 2005.)
17.  See  Eurasylum’s  website  for  full  interview,  accessed  15  October  2007,  available:  http://
www.eurasylum.org/Portal/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=2&tabid=19.
18.  Ibid.  Also  see  Chou  (2006)  who  delineates  changes  necessary  in  the  European  Union’s
institutional  structure  before  a  comprehensive  approach  to  migration  policy  will  be
accomplished. 
19.  These data are based on Papademetriou et al (2004), Table 1. In 2002, Italy’s program aimed
at domestic workers generated 704,000 applications.
20.  Ibid,  Table  1.  It  should  be  noted that  regularization  sometimes  involves  receiving  work
permits for a limited period of time (1 year in the case of Spain and the UK, 2 years in the case of
Italy), so it is possible for migrant workers to fluctuate in and out of documented status.
21.  Ibid, Table 1. Germany and the UK allow more workers to come in as refugees or asylum
seekers, but these channels still don’t add up to as many legalizations as in Italy or Spain.
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22.  Ibid, p. 15.
23.  On this point, see Lillian Trager, ed. Migration and Economy: Social and Local Dynamics. Society
for  Economic  Anthropology:  Rowman  and  Littlefield:  Lanham,  MD  2005.  Introduction:  the
Dynamics of  Migration.  “Is  migration unusual? Or is  it  a  normal part  of  human activity and
human history?” (2005, 1)
See also P Nick Kardulias and Thomas D. Hall, “A World-Systems View of Human Migration Past
and  Present:  Providing  a  General  Model  for  Understanding  the  Movement  of  People”
presentation to Oxford Round Table, July 2007. From the perspective of many millennia, very
little about “globalization” appears to be new... rather, it is the modern nation-state that is the
unusual “innovation,” and also, in the view of Kardulias and Hall, the problem. They quote a
recent book by Hatton and Williamson (2006): “There is not now, nor was there ever, too much
global migration. The world would clearly be better off with more migration. The problem is not
that  there  is  too  much global  migration,  but  rather  that  we do not  yet  have  effective  ways
whereby the gains from the global migration can compensate the losers.”
24.  The other part of this is a stereotype that women with children, or women who may at some
point have children, while they may now work in highly skilled and well-paid occupations, are at
best temporary inhabitants of that professional world. If the worldwide economic downturn has
the effect of making the use of migrant domestic labor less desired--if it is seen as a consumer
good and in some ways a  luxury – that  stereotype seems likely to make a comeback,  with a
negative effect on the income and well-being of women from both groups.
25.  As  economic  growth  proceeds  (partly  due  to  higher  productivity  of  women  in  the
professional workforce) pull factors become stronger, meaning countries are likely to see more
immigration of this sort. This will lead to some combination of tighter restrictions and more
xenophobia from a populace that already has deep resentment toward immigrants.
26.  Functionalist  arguments  about  immigration,  such  as  the  very  public  debate  in  the  UK
(summer 2008) about whether immigration was “good for Britain” are also a bit troubling – “do
They benefit Us” – though the political reasons for arguing in the affirmative are clear.
 The question of  whether  current  levels  of  migration reflect  a  crisis,  or  are  part  of  a  stable
system, is similar,  and related, to the question of whether we are witnessing “a crisis in the
family,” i.e. a breakdown of something that once worked well (but for whom?) – or whether the
situation described in this way is merely the latest version of an intrinsic dysfunctionality.
27. Much fuller discussion of this is needed, but it seems essential to consider and understand
refugees, and “economic migrants,” together rather than separately, if only because there will be
substitution  between  the  categories  depending  on  the  nature  of  government  policy.  See
Schwenken (2008) and Dewey (2008) for helpful analyses of the problem of agency in women’s
migration. 
In the interest of space we have needed to discuss the migration of women who do domestic
labor separate from women who migrate (voluntarily or otherwise) to work in the sex industry:
the  literature  about  the  latter  group  is  voluminous.  But  the  boundaries  between  the  two
populations are far from fixed, and the implications for feminist theory of a comparison would be
illuminating.
28.  See Williams and Gavanas (2008). In a three-country study, the authors found significant
differences in how the status of domestic workers is understood and articulated, conditioned in
part by national cultures and by state policies that encourage or discourage immigration as well
as the difference between a state-supported system of family welfare vs. a more “marketized”
approach.  Yet  their  conclusion  finds  striking  similarities:  “..old-style  employers  took  the
racialized  and  classed  power  relations  as  given  and  worked  within  them.  The  new  ones
attempted  to  establish  less  unequal  relationships...accounts  from  the  employees  in  all  cities
showed  that some  had  found  their  work  enjoyable  and  fulfilling,  especially  when  it  was  a
stepping-stone  to  something  better.  But  too  many  narratives  contained  dire  experiences  of
Minding the Gap: Feminist perspectives on policies affecting immigrant labor ...
Cahiers de l’Urmis, 12 | 2009
19
exploitation and of lack of trust and respect from employers. Without greater regulation, more
opportunities  for  employee  representation,  access  to  anti-discrimination measures  and more
secure migration statuses, employees’ vulnerabilities to exploitation, however well-intentioned
their employers, will still exist.”
29.  See for example Anderson (2000),  and compare Rollins (1985),  Romero (2002),  and Glenn
(1986),  on the exploitation that can result  from seeing domestic work as a relation of status
rather than a contractual relation of employment; but see Parreñas 2002 and Hondagneu-Sotelo
2001 for a view of the costs of de-personalization in care work as well.
30.  See Anderson (2000).
31.  For problems with “care,” see Narayan (1995).
32.  See for example Steedman (1987).
33.  For general critiques of the “human capital” approach, see Ferber and Nelson (1993). And
yet,  the “capabilities” approach that is often proposed as a progressive alternative is equally
recuperable to functionalist arguments, as is evident in Morrison (2008).
34.  See  also  Lutz  (2008:3-4)  “Migrant  women  are  currently  more  educated  than  their
predecessors; a section of them are from a middle-class background, and some have even reached
higher  education.  They  are  migrating  at  an  age  when  they  have  already  finished  their
educational  training,  sometimes  after  years  of  professional  experience.”  “...a  high  level  of
education  seems to  be  a  prerequisite  for  the  ‘new domestics,’  as  in  most  of  the  destination
countries they are required to speak or learn the language of their employers.”
35.  That it may be philosophically preferable to speak of women as agents rather than victims
does  not  touch  the  question  of  whether  they  actually  are  agents,  victims,  or  somewhere  in
between.  Furthermore,  as  Günseli  Berik  (2008)  has  argued,  the  exercise  of  agency  at  the
individual level may actually constrain agency at the societal level, and act to block change event
even  when  change  is  desired.  Alison  Jagger’s  (2008)  discussion  of  Okin’s  “cycle  of  gendered
vulnerability” suggests that individual agency can lead to collective disempowerment in a kind of
ironic downward spiral.
RÉSUMÉS
Beaucoup de chercheurs ont constaté qu'il existait un fossé entre les politiques d'immigration et
leurs effets réels sur le marché du travail. Pour diverses raisons, les lois ne sont pas appliquées et
les politiques ne sont pas ajustées pour refléter les nouvelles réalités de la demande de main-
d'œuvre  de  la  part  des  employeurs.  Cette  acceptation  tacite  de  l'afflux  de  travailleurs  sans
papiers perpétue l'invisibilité de ces migrants en matière de politique du travail et il prive les
migrants de la sécurité et des protections accordées aux autres travailleurs.
Cet écart entre la loi, les politiques gouvernementales et les résultats est peut-être plus prononcé
en ce qui concerne les travailleurs domestiques, dont la plupart sont des femmes. Les femmes
migrantes  ont  peu  d'accès  aux  emplois  du  secteur  formel  et,  par  conséquent,  prennent  des
emplois  du  secteur  informel,  en  général  ceux  assignés  aux  rôles  de  genre.  Ces  emplois
comprennent ce que Bridget Anderson appelle «les trois C»: cooking, caring, cleaning. Compte tenu
de la mondialisation en cours et concomitante des disparités de revenus entre pays riches et
pauvres, les migrations féminines ne cessent de s’accentuer.
Utilisant  un  cadre  comparatif,  nous  appliquons  la  théorie  féministe  au  cas  des  travailleurs
domestiques sans-papiers dans divers pays européens afin d'analyser cet écart entre la politique
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officielle et les effets réels. Nous constatons que celui-ci persiste tant dans les nouveaux pays de
destination que dans les anciens,  en partie du fait  du cadre de travail  domestique,  mais l’on
observe par ailleurs que les syndicats sont plus actifs dans les anciens pays de destination, ce qui
indique que certains progrès dans la protection des droits des travailleurs domestiques peuvent
apparaître grâce à l'action collective.
Many scholars have noted that a gap exists between government immigration policies and actual
outcomes in the labour market. For a variety of reasons, laws are not enforced and policies are
not adjusted to reflect the new realities of employers’ demand for labour. This tacit acceptance of
the  inflow  of  undocumented  workers  perpetuates  the  invisibility  of  these  immigrants  with
regard  to  labour  policy,  and it  denies  immigrants  important  safety  and security  protections
granted other workers.
This  gap  between  immigration  law,  government  policy  and  outcomes  is  perhaps  most
pronounced with regard to domestic workers, most of whom are women. Female migrants have
little access to formal sector jobs, and therefore take on informal sector jobs, typically those
derived from traditionally delineated gender roles. These jobs include what Bridget Anderson
calls “the three C’s”: cooking, cleaning and caring. Given ongoing globalization and concomitant
disparities  in  income between rich  and  poor  nations,  women will  continue  to  migrate  from
developing countries, travelling to Europe to find work in other people’s homes.
Using a comparative framework, we apply feminist theory to the case of undocumented domestic
workers  in  various  European  countries  to  analyze  this  gap  between  government  policy  and
outcomes. We find that the policy gap persists in both new and old destination countries, partly
due to the private nature of the domestic work environment, but that trade unions are more
active in older destination countries, indicating that some progress toward protecting domestic
workers rights can be made through collective action.
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